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The Dulles Affair: Stupidity or Sabotage?

The notion that John Foster Dulles's little talk with a group of favored Washington correspondents was intended to launch a trial balloon will not bear close examination. No trial balloon was needed to learn that Chiang and his Republican friends in Congress would react violently to the idea of a UN trusteeship over Formosa. No test run was required to discover that the intransigeant Syngman Rhee would object to anything less than the surrender of all North Korea. The reaction of Western Europe was easily foreseeable: there the news fed the suspicion that the United States does not want to settle the Korean war, and was therefore making politically impossible demands. If the Eisenhower Administration was seriously considering division of Korea at the "waist" and a Formosan trusteeship, it had everything to lose by premature disclosure.

If these proposals were intended to block peace, they were well framed. The North Koreans, after extraordinary suffering and heroism, would be asked to give up their capital and most of their territory. The Chinese, flushed with their success in fighting a major Western military power to a standstill for the first time in their history, would be asked to relinquish an island province they regard and we recognize as theirs. But if the purpose of these terms was to upset the peace talks, why disclose them in advance? The timing alerted and infuriated our allies and at the same time intensified unrest within Republican ranks in Congress. The effect of Dulles's talk with the correspondents was to weaken the Administration's power to hold in line its followers at home and its allies abroad, while forewarning the enemy.

The trial balloon theory rests on the assumption that Eisenhower and Dulles see eye to eye on foreign policy. But what if this assumption is untrue? Their first reactions to the "peace offensive" were strikingly different. Eisenhower said he would take conciliatory moves at face value until proven otherwise; Dulles said nothing had changed or could change as long as Russia was a Soviet dictatorship. The President's attitude reflected a readiness to negotiate; the Secretary of State indicated a belief that co-existence with the present Russian government was impossible. From such different premises must flow different attitudes toward peace in Korea.

Differences in outlook are accompanied in this case by differences in temperament. Eisenhower is a simple man, while Dulles is pompous, subtle and crafty. The latter pushed his way into the job of Secretary of State. Eisenhower has never particularly liked Dulles; the lawyer did not declare for Eisenhower until his nomination was absolutely assured. The gossip in Washington—gossip Dulles also hears—is that the President would have preferred Clay or McCloy in the job of Secretary of State, and intends to replace him. Dulles is close to MacArthur, while Eisenhower leans on the more sober military like Bradley.

Dulles has had ignominiously to tone down those ideas of "liberation" and a bold new foreign policy which he expressed last year. The watered down resolution "repudiating" Yalta which Dulles was forced to sponsor on the Hill must have been as disappointing to him as to the right wing Republicans. All that Dulles stands for must lead him to reject the idea of peace in Korea. The Adenauer visit must remind him that German rearmament, a project Acheson was able to launch only because of the war in Korea, would be endangered by its cessation. A rearmed Western Germany, securely linked to the Atlantic Pact by the hope of recovering the Eastern lands, is essential for that rollback of the Russians to their old borders on which Dulles and the "liberationists" have set their hearts.

What if Dulles deliberately upset the apple-cart? This hypothesis is more logical than that of the trial balloon. It does not require us to believe that so shrewd an old lawyer as Dulles would not realize the consequences of "spilling" so momentous a story. The calculated leak is a familiar weapon in the intramural feuds of American Administrations. There is evidence of a sharp difference of opinion within Eisenhower's official family over the tempo and magnitude of rearmament.

Eisenhower's Defense Secretary, Wilson, and his budget director, the able Detroit banker, Dodge, have antagonized the military by their plans for stretching out and reducing the arms program. Antagonism has grown to the point where Eisenhower has warned Congressmen against "military lobbyists". While the Air Force feeds out horror stories and paints the Russian air fleet in the most fearful colors (just as rival Anglo-German naval lobbies used to do before World War I), some of the bankers and big business men in this Administration (quite unlike the picture painted of them in Pravda) are fighting government by alarm and pressing hard for economy. This calls for relaxation of tension and peace, not "liberation".

Eisenhower and his aides may well have discussed the idea of a division of Korea at the "waist" and the old idea of a Formosan trusteeship as possible ways of solving the political problems with which a cease-fire will confront them. The Dulles off-the-record talk may have made these ideas seem more concrete than they were. In any case by disclosing them prematurely and as actual proposals, Dulles has made the task of achieving peace immensely more difficult. Whether this was done by obtuseness or design, it must make Eisenhower anxious to get himself a new Secretary of State. Perhaps Dulles felt his days in that office were numbered anyway.

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New Light on Malenkov's More "Liberal" Line

In trying to understand the new internal developments in the Soviet Union, it is useful to go back and restudy the report made by Malenkov last October to the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

Interest abroad has focused on the clues this reported provided as to Soviet foreign policy: Malenkov stressed the possibility of peaceful co-existence. Too little attention has been paid to the domestic aspects of that report. These are of especial interest now in assessing so startling a development as the announcement in which the accused Soviet doctors were cleared and the secret police declared guilty of a frame-up.

There is no way of knowing whether this official exposure of the secret police portends basic shifts in internal policy. But something of the sort may have been foreshadowed by the Malenkov report last October. In this, the main address to the first Communist party Congress held in the U.S.S.R. since 1939, Malenkov over and over again emphasized the importance of encouraging "critics from below".

Vengeance on Critics

The Malenkov report stressed the need for such criticism to put a check on bureaucratic elements. He had a good deal to say of those party "functionaries who . . . are intolerant of criticism from below, stifle it and wreak vengeance on the critics." These passages are given new interest now because one way to prevent such vengeance and to encourage plain speaking "from below" would be to give the ordinary Soviet citizen greater protection against arbitrary officials and the police.

The Malenkov report provides some acid portraits of the Soviet bureaucracy. Of the situation in agriculture, Malenkov said, "Some workers in Party, Soviet and agricultural bodies instead of guarding the interests of the collective farms' common enterprise themselves engage in pilfering collective farm property . . . These workers take advantage of their official position to occupy collective farm land, make collective farm boards and chairmen supply them with grain, meat, milk and other commodities free of charge or at low price. They exchange their own low productive stock for high productive and more valuable cattle belonging to the collective farms."

Commissars as Entrepeneurs

Malenkov drew a picture of similar conditions in some sectors of industry. Malenkov spoke of "business executives, with the connivance of party organizations, submitting obviously inflated lists of required raw materials and supplies, and . . . doctoring output reports to conceal non-fulfilment of production programmes. Quite a few functionaries," Malenkov continued, "forgetting that the enterprises entrusted to their supervision and leadership are state enterprises, try to turn them into their own private domains . . ."

"Another major evil," Malenkov said, "is that we have not a few individuals who seem to think that Party decisions and Soviet laws are not binding on them and imagine that we have two kinds of discipline: one for the rank and file, the other for the leaders. These 'leaders' think that everything is permitted them . . . and engage on all kinds of arbitrary action."

Stifling Criticism

Malenkov complained that "leaders of Party, Soviet and economic organizations not infrequently turn meetings . . . into ceremonial affairs, into occasions for self-praise . . . and this simply adds to the complacency and smugness." He emphasized the need for "criticism from below" as a means of correcting errors and as "an expression of the creative initiative and activity of millions of working people." He declared that "meetings must become real open forums for bold and trenchant criticism of shortcomings."

Such real forums, Malenkov said, were not to be had for the asking. He attacked "the view that criticism from below can develop of itself, automatically . . ." He declared that "It can develop . . . only on the conditions that every person who offers sound criticism can be confident that he will find support in our organizations and that the shortcomings he reveals will actually be eliminated." He asserted that it was "particularly important at this juncture . . . relentlessly to combat, as the Party's bitterest enemy, everyone who obstructs the development of criticism of our shortcomings, stifles criticism and permits persecution and reprisals for criticism."

The Need for Satire

Malenkov spoke as the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Stalin's old post. He covered the whole of Soviet life in his report, and his observations on the state of Soviet literature and science were in keeping with those he expressed on agriculture and industry. He complained, for example, that in Soviet fiction, drama and films there was no satire. In science Malenkov called for "promoting criticism and the conflict of opinions in scientific work."

Communism and Free Speech

There is no reason to suspect that Malenkov is a crypto-liberal. But his report indicates that it may be dawning on Soviet leaders that some real freedom of speech and some real safeguards against arbitrary police action are necessary for the healthy working of their society.

The whole system of planning may break down if statistics can be distorted by officials to hide their own shortcomings. Bureaucratic arteriosclerosis may spread if officials can make it hazardous for underlings and ordinary workers to speak out. The bureaucracy may become too powerful for the efficient working of the state.

Malenkov said "one of the most dangerous and pernicious infringements of Party and State discipline is concealment by some functionaries of the true state of affairs in the enterprises and offices under their charge". He asserted that "one of the most widespread and deeply rooted shortcomings in the practical work of Soviet, economic and Party organizations" was the "lack of proper verification" of whether directives had been carried out.

"Our organizations and establishments," Malenkov continued, "issue decisions, directives and orders in far greater numbers than is required, but they are little concerned about whether and how these decisions are carried out." Malenkov said, "Only verification of fulfilment from the top combined with control from below by the Party and non-party masses will ensure the timely elimination of shortcomings."

A Soviet Habeas Corpus?

But if rank-and-file party members and ordinary workers are to help check on conditions in industry, they must be freed from the fear of being punished or framed by higher-ups. It may be significant that Pravda in the announcement clearing the doctors laid new stress on Article 127 of the Soviet Constitution which "guarantees Soviet citizens the inviolability of the person. No one can be detained without a court decision or an order of the prosecutor."

If this is really enforced, it will no longer be possible for persons to be seized and held by the secret police on its own responsibility. This would begin to be equivalent to *habeas corpus*. Pravda went on the say that "the defense of the rights of Soviet citizens . . . is the most important foundation for the further development and strengthening of the Soviet State."

Pravda concluded the editorial accusing the secret police of framing the doctors by saying, "No one will be allowed to violate Soviet laws. Every worker, every collective farmer, every member of the Soviet *intelligentsia* can work safely and without fear in the knowledge that his civic rights are reliably guarded under Soviet socialist watchfulness."

Is this the beginnings of a new Malenkov line in internal policy which may reduce the swollen powers of the secret police and encourage the ordinary citizen to speak more freely?

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The Vanishing Dream Of Coolie Armies

A sobering footnote to Eisenhower's happy campaign thought about letting Asians fight Asians for us (and at half the price, too!) may be found in John Foster Dulles's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee.

After another year of campaigning—and optimistic predictions—the rebel forces in Indo China hold more villages than they did a year ago. "If the native peoples," Dulles said, "are still under the impression that all they are fighting for is to keep the French there as their colonial masters, they will not put much spirit in that kind of fight." Q.E.D.

But when, as in India, Burma and Indonesia, Asians achieve freedom from their colonial masters, they show no desire to serve as cannon fodder in quarrels between the great Powers. The dream of huge coolie armies fighting at coolie wages to "liberate" China for exploitation again by Japan and the Western powers—this is what the "let Asians fight Asians" slogan means.

At one time the Republicans in Congress seemed to understand that even the most illiterate coolie would soon catch on. When the Atlantic Pact was being debated, on no point were the Republican right wingers so vociferous as on assurance that this treaty would not commit us to the support of British and French colonialism in Asia. But that was before Chiang lost power in China and gained it in Washington, and China Lobby Senators began to shop around for some cheap way to recruit the manpower needed to restore Chiang on the mainland. The Dulles report on Indo-China shows that though we have been looking around for human bargains all we have acquired are new military and political liabilities.

Shade of Goebbels At the Pentagon

A year and a half ago the American public was being fed a heavy diet of atrocity stories on mistreatment of American prisoners of war. "Reds Butchered More Americans Than Fell in '76" said a prize headline over an Associated Press compilation purporting to show that more than 6,000 POW's had been killed by the Communists. General Ridgway, lifting his eyes heavenward, issued a statement saying that perhaps God "in his inscrutable way" had chosen this method "to bring home to our people and to the conscience of the world the moral principles of the leaders of the forces against which we fight in Korea."

Unfortunately "God" seems to be very undependable. The last time He arranged for the release of American POW's in enemy hands they came back with reports of good treatment (see the Saturday Evening Post, August 25, 1951, "They Tried to Make Our Marines Love Stalin"). This time the Pentagon is taking no chances on an inscrutable Providence. Now that sick and wounded POW's are about to be exchanged, the Pentagon has issued an 8-page "fact sheet" designed to discount in advance anything favorable which a POW may say about his captors.

It seems, according to this "fact sheet", that "by deceptively soft and ingratiating treatment" designed to make prisoners "more susceptible to indoctrination", these monsters may have led some Americans "to accept, or at least repeat, many elements of Communist propaganda". So if a prisoner comes home and says "we weren't treated too badly" or "why the heck don't we get out of Korea?", the folks will know that the poor chap's mind was poisoned by dialectical materialism.

And if the Army can't prove atrocities, it is determined at least to make good treatment of American POW's seem sinister.

The Right to Counsel— If One Can Be Found

The 4-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the disbarment of Abraham J. Isserman for contempt of court in the Foley Square trial is another blow at the effective exercise of the right to counsel. Justice Jackson pointed out for the four dissenting judges that they could recall no other instance where a lawyer had been disbarred "merely because he had been convicted of a contempt," except in the pre-revolutionary Peter Zenger case in 1735 when two lawyers defending that colonial editor were disbarred for having the temerity to file a document questioning the legality of the Judges' commission.

Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out, on the other hand, that in the trial of "Boss" Tweed several defense counsel were held in contempt for their attack upon the presiding judge for bias and prejudice. Yet none were subjected to disciplinary action and the incident did not interfere with careers which became eminent. One of the contemptuous counsel was Elihu Root. Another, David Dudley Field, was later elected president of the American Bar Association. A third became Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. Obviously the hazards of contempt when defending political corruptionists are considerably less than when defending political dissenters.

Justice Jackson said the Isserman case would have been different if there had been, as Judge Medina alleged, a deliberate conspiracy to obstruct justice. But the Court of Appeals, like the District Court in the disciplinary action, found this was not proven. The Circuit Court upheld on contempt alone. Justice Tom Clark, who urged as Attorney General that lawyers who defend radicals be disbarred, took no part in the case but his colleagues of the Truman court evidently share his views. The decision again lights up the sharp division between the Truman judges and the four, Jackson, Frankfurter, Black and Douglas, whom Roosevelt appointed.

Freedom, Like Charity . . .

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may not be able to get together on the subject of peace but on one point they agree. They both dislike the Declaration of Human Rights and they dislike it for the same reason. They fear "international interference" with internal affairs.

The Senate bloc behind the Bricker amendment and Eisenhower, in declaring that we will not support the UN covenant on human rights, are in an interesting position. Both the Senate right-wingers and the Administration are anxious to make the whole world "safe for democracy" by international action, the whole world that is except ourselves.

While the Bricker bloc wants to limit the treaty power lest it take away basic American liberties, the real fear is that international treaties like the proposed Covenant may help to enforce those rights. What gave the bar associations and the Southern Democrats the shivers is that a California court has already thrown out a discriminatory land law on the ground that it violated the UN Charter. And what happens to political restrictions on passports and visas if we become party to a treaty upholding the right to travel?

Hat's Off

To Francis Biddle and the ADA for their letter to Attorney General Herbert Brownell demanding action on the pigeonholed McCarthy report by the Senate privileges and elections subcommittee. McCarthy says if he weren't so busy he would bring criminal libel charges against Biddle. If McCarthy brought criminal libel charges against Biddle, he would have to discuss the charges brought against himself by the Senate committee. This is what McCarthy has steadily refused to do, as he has a right to—under the Fifth Amendment. Whether he has a right to continue in public office and refuse to answer embarrassing questions about his own financial practices is another matter. A lot of school teachers have lost their jobs for less.

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JENNINGS PERRY'S PAGE

The Sweet Mysteries (If Any) of Peace

Among the feats for which I am not by nature fitted, I find, is looking peace in the teeth. I cannot keep from telling myself that there is nothing mysterious about it; that after all the race is rational, peace is desirable, and that the prospect is better than usual this spring simply because the popular will has had time again to creep up on the course of human events.

Conceivably the view is too trusting. It may be indeed that the recent *démarches* which have so lifted the hopes of the peoples are, as the experts variously contend, the result of factors more influential with governments than the mere preference of the common man in the street. For example, it may at last have sunk into those people "capable of understanding only the language of force" that the United States does have atomic artillery, and a new President who will not put up with too much foolishness. Or the new peace moves could reflect mainly the need of the new head of the Russian state to overcome the restlessness of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, and the temperate reception of them in Washington the need of a restored Republican administration above all to make good its promise to balance the budget and cut taxes.

I am not convinced; though if the undeniably brighter outlook for peace must be attributed to the political circumstances of new national regimes cast in opposition by old national rivalry, acceptance of either of the two reasons last named—or both—would not be contrary to the concept of popular rule. Both relate to demands in the street which cannot be met save under conditions of peace. The heads of new administrations do face the problem of establishing themselves in the popular favor; and if the teachers on one side of the Curtain are preparing to tell the children that Malenkov had to taper off the Cold War to keep his people quiet, and the teachers on the other side are preparing to tell the children that Eisenhower had to do the same thing to relieve the tax burden in America, it still will be taught that *vox populi* is *vox dei.*

I see nothing in the other explanation of the Russian "peace blitz" (that the Kremlin now is overawed by the military might the West has put together in fact and on paper) that satisfies ordinary common sense—or that promises any real peace. It is a theory that could be comforting only to those who have maintained there is no substitute for victory; it is a sort of left-handed claim of victory. It is, of course, unprovable. And as a belief on which the West might rest its understanding of the present peace moves, it is a formula for the perpetuation of the arms race, of "world tension" and of all the waste of human and natural resources that attends the effort of two worlds to be unendingly "ready for war."

It is a theory which conveniently forgets that the rulers of the Kremlin have been (if only in their imagination) living under the threat of atomic annihilation for the past seven years without particularly changing their ways, and which artfully supposes that the rulers of another country would be less willing to risk the destruction of their cities and populations to preserve their principles and their honor than we are ourselves. What is worse, it is a theory which overlooks our own oft-pronounced conviction that the people everywhere yearn for peace and that the people everywhere, in whom all power inheres, will exert their sovereignty despite any tyranny whatsoever.

Our armed might has done as well in Korea as anybody's armed might; it has done loyally and bravely what it was sent to do . . . and so, we must grant, has the armed might sent against it. If there is a lasting cease-fire, each side, if it chooses, can push the claim that the other was forced to come to terms. That way all national vanities would be coddled, and the myth preserved that God has served the side with the heaviest artillery.

The preservation of the self-esteem of humanity would seem however to require that a termination of the hostilities be based on mutual forbearance and the wilful transfer of all disputes from the field of battle to the arena of reason. It will not hurt humanity in its own proper estimation if this transfer is acknowledged to be upon the demand and at the direction of worldwide sentiment. It would be, obviously, the finest demonstration of the existence and usefulness of manly intelligence the rest of animate creation would ever have had an occasion to witness.

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